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RECOVERY OF COURT-APPOINTED DEFENSE COSTS:
FRAMEWORK FOR A MODEL RECOUPMENT
STATUTE
The right to court-appointed counsel of those criminal defendants
who are unable to afford retained counsel was first announced by the
United States Supreme Court in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama, I where the
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
2
rendered the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to the assistance
of counse 3 applicable to the states, and, as a result, all indigent defend-
ants were entitled to appointed counsel in capital cases. Although ten
years later the Court appeared to back off somewhat in Betts v. Brady,4
in 1963 the right to appointed counsel was extended to all needy felony
defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright.5 Following Gideon, this right was
quickly expanded to include both representation at various "critical
stages"'6 of criminal proceedings as well as representation for less seri-
ous offenses. 7 The expansion culminated in Argersinger v. Hamlin,8
where counsel was held to be required for any criminal proceeding
which could result in incarceration, no matter how brief.9
1. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides, in pertinent part:
[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ....
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.
4. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts held that the right to appointed counsel should be considered
in light of principles of fundamental fairness on a case-by-case basis and should be mandated only
when special circumstances were present. In subsequent cases, the Court usually found such cir-
cumstances. In fact, in the thirteen-year period preceding Gideon, the Court had found special
circumstances in every case. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This decision expressly overruled Betts. 1d. at 339.
6. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967), for the Court's analysis of the
expansion of the mandatory right to appointed counsel and its explanation of "critical stages."
7. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (post-indictment lineups); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearings prior to indictment); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967) (probation and parole revocation hearings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(pretrial lineups and showups); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings which might
result in commitment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966) (custodial interrogations).
8. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
9. The Court's holding in Argersinger has been refined in several recent decisions. See
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot convert
a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony under an enhanced penalty statute); Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (even though predicate felony conviction was uncounseled and subject
to collateral attack on constitutional grounds, it could still be used for subsequent conviction
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Paralleling these due process and right to counsel cases is another
group of cases which relies on the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment' 0 in assuring the indigent defendant substantially
equal treatment in the criminal justice system. In Grin v. Illinois,I
the Supreme Court held that equal protection requires that convicted
indigents cannot be denied access to appellate review simply because
they cannot afford the expense of trial transcripts. Consequently, states
are obliged to furnish transcripts to indigents free of charge. Justice
Black's plurality opinion enunciated a principle which has often -been
reiterated: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has."' 2 Griffin was followed
by Burns v. Ohio,' 3 in which the Court held that a filing fee for an
appeal cannot be required of an indigent. Then, on the same day that
it announced Gideon, the Court in Douglas v. California 14 affirmed the
indigent's right to counsel for first appeals which by statute are granted
as a matter of right. Using an equal protection analysis, the Court held
that conditioning the appointment of counsel for an indigent's appeal
on a preliminary showing of merit constitutes invidious discrimination
against the indigent.
The cumulative effect of these decisions was that states and their
local subunits confronted a substantial financial burden in underwrit-
ing the expenditures for appointed counsel.' 5 Moreover, in addition to
appointed counsel, states were obliged to provide the needy defendant
with a number of other ancillary services.' 6 In response to this ever-
under federal firearms statute); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (as long as defendant is not
sentenced to actual imprisonment, fact that imprisonment was a possible sentence does not invali-
date uncounseled conviction).
10. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I provides, in pertinent part:
[N]or shall any State. . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
11. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
12. Id. at 19.
13. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
14. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). California provides appellants with a two-tiered appellate proce-
dure: review by the intermediate appellate court is available to all defendants as a matter of right;
the higher court only hears cases at its discretion. Before Douglas invalidated the procedure,
needy appellants seeking appointment of counsel first had to demonstrate to the intermediate
appellate court that their appeals were worthy before that court would provide them with an
attorney. Id. at 354-55. As a result, unless such appointment was made, needy appellants were
forced to appeal pro se.
15. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972).
16. See State v. Fuller, 12 Or. App. 152, 164-65, 504 P.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (1973) (Fort, J.,
dissenting) (investigators, psychiatrists and psychologists, handwriting and ballistics experts);
Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense. Expert and Investigational Assistance in Crimi-
nalProceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970) (analysis of judicial and statutory rationale for
providing supportive services); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counselfor Indigent Criminal
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increasing drain on their treasuries, some jurisdictions began adopting
and applying a variety of means of recovering some of the funds thus
expended from those benefitted by the expenditures-the indigent
criminal defendants themselves.
State reviewing courts, responding to these attempts with little
guidance from the United States Supreme Court, wrestled with issues
such as due process, equal protection and the "chill" of the right to
counsel17 and reached divergent conclusions as to the constitutionality
of recoupment schemes.' 8 In 1974, however, the Court decided Fuller v.
Oregon 19 and held constitutionally permissible a statute allowing re-
covery of appointed defense costs when imposed as a condition of pro-
bation. The Court indicated that its approval of the scheme was
premised on the statute's incorporation of a number of procedural safe-
guards, principally one allowing recoupment only when the defendant
has been shown to have sufficient financial capacity to meet the repay-
ment obligation.20  The principal Fuller guideline was then acknowl-
edged in most subsequent decisions of state and federal courts
considering recoupment, and the presence or absence of a provision for
determining the defendant's ability to pay became the decisive factor in
the validation or invalidation of the scheme under scrutiny. These de-
cisions, however, in reviewing schemes different from the Oregon stat-
Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1055 (1963) (fees for expert witnesses, investigatory costs
incurred in locating missing witnesses, accountants).
17. The "chill" doctrine was originally formulated in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), where the Court invalidated a portion of the Federal Kidnapping Act which provided that
the death penalty could be imposed only when the defendant chose to have a jury trial. Thus, the
defendant's right to a jury trial was held to have been "chilled" by the fact that he would be
risking his life by exercising this right. The Court stated: "Whatever might be said of Congress'
objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitu-
tional rights. . . .The question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than inten-
tional; the question is whether the effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Id. at 582. A
constitutional right, thus, is "chilled" when its exercise is inhibited by some factor which is "un-
necessary" to the state's objective. In the context of recoupment, the "chill" doctrine has been
raised with reference to the discouraging effect that mere knowledge of possible recoupment can
have on the defendant. See In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 391, 455 P.2d 143, 144, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207,
208 (1969). The fact that the defendant plays no part in the initial fee arrangement may also
discourage him from accepting appointed counsel. See State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash.
2d 676, 681, 521 P.2d 706, 709 (1974). Knowing that it would be an additional expense for which
he might be liable, the defendant might also be discouraged from requesting a jury trial. See
People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 28, 523 P.2d 1173, 1177, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769 (1974).
18. "Recoupment" in the context of this note refers only to the exacting of repayment from
the defendant himself of some or all of the funds spent by the government in providing him with
defense services. It is not to be confused with the equitable right of a defendant in a civil action to
have certain amounts deducted from the plaintiff's assessed award of damages for reasons arising
from the same transaction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1146-47 (5th ed. 1979).
19. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
20. Id. at 52-54.
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ute approved in Fuller, often raised issues not addressed in Fuller and
cast some doubt on the validity of the recoupment statute at issue.
Indeed, the arguable unfairness inherent in first affording a de-
fendant the "right" to appointed counsel and then compelling him to
pay for this "right" has met with sharp criticism. 21 Besides their seem-
ing oppressiveness, especially with respect to acquitted defendants, re-
coupment laws have been criticized for their inability to generate
significant revenue, the rationale for their very existence. 22 For these
reasons, the continued adoption of such laws has been discouraged.
23
The justification for recoupment thus appears to be questionable unless
the statutes themselves are made less oppressive or another legitimate
objective for their enactment can be established. A purpose, perhaps,
can be gleaned from the view that once a state decides to make a previ-
ously needy defendant financially liable for the exercise of a constitu-
tional right, it should also grant him every advantage enjoyed by the
nonindigent who normally must pay for that right. Such statutes, then,
can become the foundation for providing the needy defendant with a
better quality of defense and with a greater measure of choice and con-
trol with respect to this defense than he now generally has. The indi-
gent defendant, like his paying counterpart, should be able to "retain"
as well as discharge the attorney of his choice. In this way, regardless
of the practical and ethical objections to recoupment, the practice can
be turned from being merely a dubious means of meeting a state fiscal
objective into an assurance to the needy defendant that the kind of trial
he gets does not depend on the amount of money he has.
This note will first examine the responses of reviewing courts to
various attempts at recoupment, focusing on the significant issues
raised in those opinions. Present statutory recoupment schemes will
then be examined and evaluated in light of these decisions. Finally, a
model recoupment statute24 will be suggested, one which both serves
the state purpose of generating as much revenue as it reasonably can,
21. See, e.g., Note, Recoupment Statutes.- Free Defense-for a Price, 53 J. URB. L. 89 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Recoupment Statutes].
22. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1972); Note, New Jersey's Public Defender
Lien System: Burdening the Indigent, 4 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 309, 317-18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Burdening the Indigent].
23. See ABA, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.4 (Approved Draft 1968): "Reimburse-
ment of counsel or the organization or govenmental unit providing counsel should not be re-
quired, except on the ground of fraud in obtaining the determination of eligibility."
24. A model recoupment statute was suggested before the development of the present case
law on the subject in UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, MODEL DEFENSE OF NEEDY PERSONS ACT
§ 8 (1966). This model was subsequently adopted, with varying changes, by a number of states.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3211 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-858 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-7
(1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5255 (1974); WYO. STAT. § 7-1-114 (1977).
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and also affords the indigent defendant maximum procedural protec-
tion while elevating him, as much as possible, to the position occupied
by the nonindigent defendant with retained counsel.
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO RECOUPMENT
The Early Split of Authority
Recoupment schemes have met with a variety of responses when
subjected to judicial review, although the major legal issues raised-
equal protection, due process and "chill" of the right to counsel-have
appeared in most decisions in various permutations. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Fuller v. Oregon,25 which upheld a recoup-
ment scheme and in so doing enunciated certain procedural safeguards
which ensured its constitutionality, there was a clear split of authority
with regard to the validity of such schemes. The majority position, at
least initially, seemed to disfavor their use; however, a more sympa-
thetic position soon emerged. As long as certain criteria were met,
courts began showing a willingness to uphold such statutes. The
Supreme Court, moreover, while striking down two recoupment stat-
utes prior to Fuller, nevertheless in dicta left the door ajar for reason-
able recoupment plans.
26
The first such scheme to be addressed was a New Jersey statute
27
which, though not actually providing for a recoupment of attorney's
fees, permitted the state to recover the cost of transcripts provided to
convicted indigent appellants from their prison pay. The United States
Supreme Court held in 1966 in Rinaldi v. Yeager28 that by singling out
for the reimbursement obligation only those unsuccessful appellants
who happened to be imprisoned--those receiving probation or sus-
pended sentences escaping such obligation--the statute violated the
"rational relationship" standard of equal protection. 29 In dicta, how-
25. 417 U.S. 40 (1974). See text accompanying notes 65-81 infra.
26. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 311 (1966).
27. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 307 (1966), citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:152-18 (West
Supp. 1964).
28. 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
29. The Warren Court used a two-tiered approach to equal protection: "strict scrutiny" was
applied to statutes or regulations affecting "suspect" classifications or "fundamental interests" and
required that the statute or regulation promote a compelling state interest and also be the least
restrictive alternative available; minimal scrutiny, employing the "rational relationship" test, was
applied in all other situations and merely required that the statute or regulation under review bear
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. This latter approach was extremely deferential
and rarely, at least until late in the Warren era, resulted in statutory invalidation. See Gunther,
Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court." A Modelfor a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972). Attempting to escape the rigid confines of this two-tiered
analysis, the Burger Court has struggled with various formulations of intermediate levels of scru-
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ever, the Court seemed to place its imprimatur on other, more equita-
ble recoupment schemes: "We may assume that a legislature could
validly provide for replenishing a county treasury from the pockets of
those who have directly benefitted from county expenditures."
30
State courts also considered the viability of recoupment attempts,
the first being the Supreme Court of Iowa in Woodbury County v. An-
derson,3' decided in January, 1969. Subsequent to the defendant's ac-
quittal on a charge of rape and the payment of his court-appointed
attorney from the local "court fund," the county sued to recover the
amount expended relying on a statutory provision which permitted re-
covery of money spent "for the relief or support of a poor person.
'32
The trial court's reimbursement order was reversed by the supreme
court which found the statute inapplicable for this purpose because of
its vagueness. 33 In so holding, however, the court discounted the de-
fendant's argument that any such recoupment was per se invalid: "It
would be constitutionally permissible for the legislature to include a
provision that expenditures made under this section be taxed as part of
the costs against a defendant [who is] convicted . . . .This is a matter
fundamentally for legislative, not judicial, treatment.
'34
In June, 1969, the Supreme Court of California rejected the impo-
sition of recoupment as a condition of probation in In re 41en,35 the
leading case in decisions critical of recoupment. The defendant was
convicted of possession of a restricted dangerous drug and sentenced to
probation, one condition of which was that she reimburse the county
for her court-appointed counsel. Although the California Penal Code
did not contain a specific provision for such a condition, it was imposed
through the probation statute's "omnibus" clause which permitted the
tiny and has succeeded in establishing such a test in the area of sex discrimination. The Court has
held that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(emphasis added). See also 60 CORNELL L. REV. 670, 671 n.6 (1975), where the author suggests
that the Court's tolerant attitude toward recoupment statutes is a reflection of its sense of responsi-
bility for imposing on the states the burden of defending the indigent.
30. 384 U.S. at 309. An additional argument had been raised that the scheme "chilled" the
appellant's right to appeal by its imposition of the reimbursement requirement; however, the
Court avoided the issue. Id. at 307-08.
31. 164 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1969).
32. Id. at 131, citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.13 (West 1966).
33. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Giaccio v. Penn-
sylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). Giaccio invalidated an 1860 Pennsylvania statute which permitted
the imposition of costs on both convicted and acquitted defendants on the grounds that it created
a denial of due process. The statute's vagueness and absence of standards did not enable defen-
dants to protect themselves from an arbitrary and discriminatory application.
34. 164 N.W.2d at 133-34.
35. 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969).
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court to set "other reasonable conditions" 36 to the granting of proba-
tion. The state supreme court found that such a condition was "an im-
pediment to the free exercise of a right guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. ' 37 Since the practice of imposing such conditions was be-
coming more common, the court reasoned that the knowledge of this
practice might lead some needy defendants to conclude that the court's
offer of "free" counsel is a deception: "This knowledge is quite likely
to deter or discourage many defendants from accepting the offer of
counsel despite the gravity of the need for such representation .... *38
The court also noted the "chill" created by the poor bargaining position
of the indigent defendant with respect to his appointed counsel. Al-
though he may well be required to pay, the indigent defendant is not a
party to a determination of the amount he may be charged and, in ef-
fect, must underwrite a "blank check" for his defense services.
39
In August, 1969, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Opinion
of the Justices40 considered a proviso to an appropriation of funds for
payment of court-appointed counsel which required partial repayment
from indigents of any amounts spent.4 ' The court did not reach the
question of whether the proviso offended the federal Constitution, find-
ing instead that it violated the state constitution which specifically pro-
vided for the "right to counsel at the expense of the state if need is
shown."' 42 The court remarked, however, that although it may have
been difficult to draft constitutional reimbursement provisions, such
provisions are not inherently "illogical. '43 The court observed that if
the proviso had been addressed at only those defendants who were ca-
pable of repayment, it would not have conflicted with the state consti-
tutionA4 Thus, this was the first judicial mention of the defendant's
ability to pay, a factor which later was to become crucial to any consid-
eration of recoupment.
In 1971, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
36. Id. at 390, 455 P.2d at 143-44, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08 (emphasis omitted), citing CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1969). See note 131 infra for other examples of "omnibus" provi-
sions.
37. 71 Cal. 2d at 392, 455 P.2d at 145, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
38. Id. at 391, 455 P.2d at 144, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
39. Id. at 393, 455 P.2d at 146, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
40. 109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500 (1969).
41. The proviso, added as a footnote to the appropriation, required repayment of 10% of any
amounts spent, with a minimum repayment of $5 and a maximum of $20. Id. at 510, 256 A.2d at
501-02.
42. Id. at 512, 256 A.2d at 502, quoting N.H. CONST. art. 15, part I.
43. Id. at 511, 256 A.2d at 502.
44. Id. at 512, 256 A.2d at 502.
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in Strange v. James45 considered a full-fledged recoupment statute
which provided for recovery of court-appointed defense costs from all
defendants, acquitted or convicted. The defendant was determined in-
digent by the trial court and pleaded guilty to a charge of pocket pick-
ing. The Kansas Judicial Administrator, pursuant to the statute,
requested the defendant to repay the state within sixty days or a judg-
ment in the amount of the fee would be entered against him.46 In its
opinion, the district court focused on the violation of the sixth amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel and, in forthright language, it
expressed no doubts that the statute "returns the indigent accused to
the lawyerless position he occupied prior to the decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright . ' 4 7 The "unnecessary" nature of the recoupment discour-
aged indigents from exercising their constitutional right and therefore
had a "chilling" effect on this right.48 Moreover, the very specificity of
the statute rendered it incapable of any narrow construction which
might have made it constitutional.
49
On review by writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's invalidation of the Kansas recoupment stat-
ute.50 Without reaching the sixth amendment question, however, the
Court found the statute invalid on equal protection grounds. It held
that, in requiring the indigent defendant to reimburse the state for his
court-appointed counsel, the statute failed to accord him all of the pro-
tective exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors5' and thus
offended the equal protection clause. The Court, as it did in Rinaldi,
applied the deferential "rational relationship" standard in its analy-
sis.52 The Court noted the wide variety of state recoupment laws and
declined to make "any broadside pronouncement on their general va-
lidity."'53 Indeed, the Court went on to enumerate objectives furthered
45. 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
46. Id. at 1231.
47. Id. at 1232.
48. Id. at 1232-33. The court reviewed the "chill" doctrine as it was expressed in United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See note 17 supra for a discussion of how recoupment may
be "unnecessary."
49. 323 F. Supp. at 1232.
50. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
51. The exemptions accorded civil judgment debtors in Kansas (but not to those subject to
the recoupment statute) include restrictions on the amount of income subject to garnishment, re-
strictions on garnishment at times of personal or family illness, and exemption from attachment
and execution on the debtor's clothing, books, furnishings, tools of trade, food, means of transpor-
tation and pension funds. Id. at 135. Conversely, a homestead exemption was the only one spe-
cifically accorded the recoupment debtor. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4513 (Supp. 1971).
52. 407 U.S. at 140-41. See note 29 supra.
53. 407 U.S. at 133.
464
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by recoupment laws,54 concluding "that state recoupment statutes may
betoken legitimate state interests." 5" Although the Court thus signalled
to state legislatures that it might well approve recoupment statutes in
the future provided that they were drafted more fairly, it failed to artic-
ulate the standards it might require such statutes to meet.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina became the first court to
uphold a recoupment scheme in State v. Foust.-6 The defendant was
given a suspended sentence and placed on probation on the condition
that he repay the state for the amount spent for his court-appointed
attorney. The defendant failed to make payments and probation was
revoked. Rejecting the "chill" argument of In reAllen, the North Car-
olina court compared the position of the indigent defendant with that
of the nonindigent:
That nonindigents may be discouraged from engaging counsel by the
fact they are required to pay does not mean that the State must pro-
vide them free counsel, or that a reluctance on their part to incur cost
of counsel unconstitutionally impedes their right 'under the Sixth
Amendment. We know of no reason, and none has been suggested to
us, why indigents should be placed in a preferred position by being
relieved of choices that naturally arise to all defendants.
57
Although the court held the recoupment scheme generally to be valid,
it held that revoking probation simply because of nonpayment was
not.58 An inquiry into the probationer's ability to pay must first be
conducted in order to determine whether the failure to pay had been
willful or without lawful excuse. 59 The court thus was not only the first
to approve a recoupment scheme, but was also the first to apply the
ability to pay standard as the test of its validity.
54. The Court stated:
Recoupment proceedings may protect the State from fraudulent concealment of assets
and false assertions of indigency. Many States, moreover, face expanding criminal dock-
ets, and this Court has required appointed counsel for indigents in widening classes of
cases and stages of prosecution. Such trends have heightened the burden on public reve-
nues, and recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the added costs.
Finally, federal dominance of the Nation's major revenue sources has encouraged state
and local governments to seek new methods of conserving public funds, not only through
the recoupment of indigents' counsel fees but of other forms of public assistance as well.
Id. at 141 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id.
56. 13 N.C. App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972).
57. Id. at 384, 185 S.E.2d at 720.
58. Id. at 387, 185 S.E.2d at 722.
59. Id. This aspect of Foust was later overruled when the same court held that the burden of
proof was on the defendant to establish his inability to pay; otherwise, mere nonpayment could
justify the presumption of bad faith. State v. Young, 21 N.C. App. 316, 204 S.E.2d 185 (1974).
This more uncompromising standard was reviewed in light of Fuller by one writer who suggested
that the North Carolina recoupment system is on infirm constitutional ground. See II WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 490 (1975).
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A year later, in 1973, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v.
Gerard60 extended the Foust rationale and found that reimbursement
as a condition of probation was constitutionally valid. In Gerard, as in
Foust, the condition had been applied pursuant to an "omnibus"
clause. The defendant had argued that the knowledge that such a con-
dition might be applied "chilled" his right to counsel and also induced
his waiver of a jury trial. The court responded that the condition was
constitutional because it was discretionary to begin with and was sub-
ject to reexamination during the term of probation, with the reviewing
court considering the probationer's continuing capacity to pay.
61
The growing trend toward validating recoupment schemes, so long
as certain procedural requirements were satisfied, gained impetus in
State v. Fuller,62 where the Court of Appeals of Oregon upheld a stat-
ute which conditioned probation on the recoupment of appointed
counsel fees as part of costs specially incurred by the state in prosecut-
ing the defendant. 63 The court held that the statute offended neither
the right to counsel nor the equal protection clause because the statute
provided that the repayment condition could only be imposed on those
convicted defendants with the continuing ability to pay and because the
probationer is not denied any of the protective exemptions available to
other judgment debtors in the state. 64
Fuller v. Oregon
Although the Oregon Supreme Court declined to review the deci-
sion in State v. Fuller, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and, in Fuller v. Oregon,65 upheld the Oregon statute in what has
since become the touchstone opinion regarding recoupment laws.
66
The Court evidently interceded to lend its great authority to settle, for
the time being at least, the growing dichotomy in the case law. 67 Cases
following In re Allen had held that recoupment schemes exercised an
impermissible "chill" on the sixth amendment right to counsel, while
several more recent cases had found such schemes permissible, pro-
60. 57 Wis. 2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804 (1973).
61. Id. at 625-27, 205 N.W.2d at 382-83.
62. 12 Or. App. 152, 504 P.2d 1393 (1973) (2-1 decision).
63. Id. at 157, 504 P.2d at 1396.
64. Id. at 158-59, 504 P.2d at 1396-97.
65. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
66. See, e.g., Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150, 154-55 (10th Cir. 1979); State v. Miller, Il1 Ariz.
558, 559, 535 P.2d 15, 16 (1975); State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 817-18, 557 P.2d 314, 317-18
(1976).
67. The Court specifically noted "the importance of the question presented and the conflict of
opinion on the constitutional issue involved." 417 U.S. at 42.
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vided that the crucial element of the defendant's ability to pay was
taken into consideration. The Court in Fuller rejected Allen and
aligned itself with the more recent trend.
68
In the six-justice majority opinion written by Justice Stewart, the
Court first rejected the defendant's claim that equal protection was vio-
lated "because of various classifications explicitly or implicitly drawn
by the legislative provisions," 69 an argument which the Court had ac-
cepted in James v. Strange.70 The Court said that the Oregon statute,
unlike that invalidated in James, provided the defendant with all ex-
emptions available to other judgment debtors. 71 A second equal pro-
tection challenge focused on the distinction between convicted
defendants and those acquitted or whose convictions were reversed on
appeal. The Court deemed this classification noninvidious and ration-
ally related to the state's purpose of sparing an acquitted defendant or
one whose conviction was reversed from further imposition by the
state.72 The final challenge to the statute was that.it "chilled" the de-
fendant's right to counsel because, knowing that he may remain under
an obligation to pay for his defense services, the defendant might be
reluctant to accept appointed counsel. The Court quickly dismissed the
"chill" argument articulated in Allen as "wide of the constitutiotial
mark."'73 It reasoned that the defendant is in no way denied his right to
the assistance of counsel, and the knowledge that he may later be re-
quired to pay for it has no effect on his eligibility for appointed coun-
sel.74 The Court sustained the Oregon statute because it was carefully
drawn "to impose an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable
ability to meet it, and to enforce that obligation only against those who
actually become able to meet it without hardship.
75
The carefully-tailored safeguards of the Oregon statute which the
Court approved and which are cited with some regularity in subse-
quent lower court decisions are:76 (1) that repayment is never
mandatory; (2) that only convicted defendants can be subject to a re-
coupment obligation; (3) that repayment must be conditioned on the
68. Id. at 51-52.
69. Id. at 48.
70. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
71. 417 U.S. at 47.
72. Id. at 49-50. The Court thus continued to apply the deferential "rational relationship"
standard for evaluating recoupment schemes. See note 29 supra.
73. 417 U.S. at 52.
74. Id. at 52-53. Criticism has been leveled at Fuller for its apparent equating of "chill" with
"total denial" of the sixth amendment right. See 60 CORNELL L. REV. 670, 679-83 (1975).
75. 417 U.S. at 54.
76. See text accompanying notes 82-128 infra.
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defendant's ability to pay; (4) that the defendant may petition the court
at any time for remission of the repayment and the court may remit
such costs if repayment imposes a manifest hardship on the defendant
or his family; and (5) that no convicted person can be held in contempt
if his failure to repay was not due to an intentional refusal to do so.
77
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion focused on the narrow con-
struction of the recoupment statute which he said eliminated the "chill"
argument:
Under these circumstances, the "chill" on the exercise of the right to
counsel is no greater than that imposed on a nonindigent defendant
without great sums of money. Even though such a defendant can
afford counsel, he might well be more ready to accept free appointed
counsel than to retain counsel himself. Yet a State is not therefore
required by the Federal Constitution to provide appointed counsel
for nonindigent defendants.
78
Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, maintained
that the statute offended equal protection in that, unlike other debtors,
the probationer who is required to reimburse the state can be sent to
prison for his failure to make payments. 79 By contrast, a nonindigent
probationer who has defaulted on a payment to his retained attorney
cannot be imprisoned. 80 The majority rejected this analysis, reasoning
that revocation of probation is not a "collection device" but a sanction
imposed for the willful refusal to comply with a court order. The Court
further noted that because such an order can be entered only when the
probationer has the proven ability to pay, but has refused to do so, the
equal protection defect noted in James does not apply. 81
Beyond Fuller
In the wake of Fuller, courts were forced to consider the standards
for recoupment schemes which the decision set. Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Washington both before and after Fuller illustrate
the impact of the case. Decided less than a month before Fuller, State
ex rel Brundage v. Eide8 2 reviewed a trial court order directing an indi-
77. 417 U.S. at 44-46. Hereinafter, the terms "Fuller safeguards" or "Fuller guidelines" refer
to these features of the Oregon statute which were approved by the Court.
78. Id. at 56 (Douglas, J., concurring). This echoes the North Carolina court's rationale in
Foust. See 13 N.C. App. 382, 384, 185 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1972). See also text accompanying notes
56-59 supra.
79. 417 U.S. at 59-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 61.
81. Id. at 48 n.9. The Court relegated its brief reply to the dissent to a footnote, reasoning
that it did not have to address the argument because it had not been brought up below and was
therefore not properly before the Court. Id.
82. 83 Wash. 2d 676, 521 P.2d 706 (1974).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
gent, at the time of his arraignment, to repay his appointed counsel fees
within six months of the arraignment if such repayment was not
financially burdensome. Relying on In re Allen, the supreme court
held that such an order, imposed without reference to an authorizing
statute, "chilled" the exercise of the indigent's right to counsel. 83 Fur-
thermore, the absence of any standards sufficient to permit the defen-
dant to protect himself from an arbitrary imposition of repayment
invalidated the order on due process grounds.84 Thus, despite the fact
that the defendant's ability to pay would presumably be taken into ac-
count before the final imposition of the order, the recoupment attempt
was struck down. In State v. Hess,8 5 decided after Fuller, the same
court invalidated a lower court order that a convicted defendant pay
the costs of his court-appointed defense as a condition of probation.
The court reviewed the Fuller-approved safeguards and held that since
such safeguards were neither present in the "omnibus" clause under
which the condition was imposed nor were followed by the imposing
court, the repayment condition was invalid. 6 Conversely, the Wash-
ington court in State v. Barklind 7 upheld a recoupment probation con-
dition because it meticulously complied with all the Fuller guidelines,
even though imposed by the court pursuant to an "omnibus" clause.
As was true of the cases preceding Fuller, the principal arguments
raised in the cases after Fuller against recoupment were based on pur-
ported due process, equal protection and right to counsel violations,
often interdependently bound together. However, these constitutional
requirements were generally deemed to have been satisfied where the
defendant's ability to pay was considered before imposition of a repay-
ment obligation.
The Supreme Court of California, whose decision in Allen was the
standard for recoupment invalidation, was confronted with a series of
challenges to a newly-enacted recoupment statute in People v. Amor.88
83. Id. at 680-81, 521 P.2d at 709. This "chill" can be due to both the defendant's knowledge
that recoupment might take place and also his uncertainty as to the extent of his liability because
he is not a party to setting the amount of compensation. Id.
84. Id. at 681, 521 P.2d at 709.
85. 86 Wash. 2d 51, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975).
86. Id. at 53-54, 541 P.2d at 1223-24. See text accompanying note 77 supra for the five Fuller
safeguards accepted in Hess.
87. 87 Wash. 2d 814, 557 P.2d 314 (1977) (5-4 decision). The court noted that a statute simi-
lar to that upheld in Fuller had been passed by the state legislature during the time between the
imposition of the probation condition and the announcement of the court's decision. Because the
court did not wish to render the new statute invalid, it declined to impose a higher constitutional
standard than that announced in Fuller. Id. at 818, 557 P.2d at 318.
88. 12 Cal. 3d 20, 523 P.2d 1173, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). The California statute provided
for recovery of defense fees from all defendants with appointed counsel so long as the court found
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The defendant had argued that the trial court's imposition of a repay-
ment order "chilled" her right to counsel. Without actually overruling
Allen, the court carefully distinguished its earlier decision on the
grounds that in Allen the defendant was not given prior notice of possi-
ble recoupment, was liable for the entire fee without a finding that she
had the ability to pay and could be imprisoned for nonpayment. Con-
versely, in Amor the defendant was given prior notice, was ordered to
pay only that portion of the fee which the court had determined her
capable of paying, and, because execution was only issuable as a civil
judgment, not as contempt, she could not be imprisoned for nonpay-
ment.
89
Amor also considered a related "chill" argument: the defendant,
knowing that she may have to pay for her defense, might be reluctant
to incur the additional expense of a jury trial. The court found that the
argument would have been more persuasive with respect to nonindi-
gent defendants with limited means who must pay the full amount of
their defense costs than for indigent defendants who may be required
to pay for only a portion of such costs.90 Moreover, the court stated
that some burden on the exercise of a constitutional right is permissible
and that only an "excessive" burden is not. The court found that the
defendant had failed to establish an "excessive" burden.
91
The defendant had also raised a two-pronged due process chal-
lenge against the statute. First, she had argued that acquitted defend-
ants were denied due process by being punished, in effect, with the
repayment liability. The court asserted, however, that a mere obliga-
tion to repay based on financial ability is not punishment.92 A second
challenge, that the defendant was deprived of property without due
process, was also discounted: while not expressly provided for by the
statute, notice was in fact given the defendant and is implicit in the
statute's several procedural safeguards.
93
them able to pay for all or part of such fees and in installments compatible with their financial
ability; execution of the debt could only be issued as a civil judgment and nonpayment could not
be enforced by contempt. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West Supp. 1973-1974).
89. 12 Cal. 3d at 25-26, 523 P.2d at 1176, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
90. Id. at 28, 523 P.2d at 1177, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 28-29, 523 P.2d at 1178, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 770. The court also noted that the de-
fendant, who had been convicted, had no standing to make this argument. Id.
93. Id. at 29, 523 P.2d at 1178-79, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71. The current version of the re-
coupment statute incorporates a prior notice provision. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(b) (West Supp.
1979-1980). As for the other arguments raised by the defendant, the court quickly rejected a claim
that the statute was invalid because it did not allow for a trial by jury to determine the amount of
the defendant's financial liability. 12 Cal. 3d at 30-31, 523 P.2d at 1179-80, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 771-
72. The court also dismissed an equal protection challenge by noting that the statute properly
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In Wicks v. City of Charlottesville 94 the Supreme Court of Virginia
sustained a statute permitting the recovery of court-appointed counsel
fees as part of the taxed costs of prosecution, rejecting an argument that
the statute "chilled" the defendant's right to counsel. The court noted
that prior to his conviction the defendant had requested the appoint-
ment of counsel and had completed an affidavit of indigency. There-
fore, there was no "chill" in fact and consequently the defendant could
not later assert the constitutional violation. 95 The court observed that
although the right to appointed counsel is guaranteed to indigents, no
court to date had held "that every constitutional right or privilege
should be available to all persons without any cost or obligation on
their part. Free legal service for all may be the ultimate, but if so it
must come by legislation, or from some source other than by judicial
fiat of this court."
'96
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey sus-
tained that state's Public Defender Act 97 in Stroinski v. Office of Public
Defender98 in the face of a constitutional challenge, liberally construing
the statute's questionable provisions. The court held that the statute
does not create a "chilling" effect on the right to counsel because ac-
cording to the statute the defendant is under no obligation to repay
unless he is in fact capable of so doing and, even then, such repayment
would be in amounts that he could reasonably be expected to pay.99
Equal protection is satisfied because the indigent has all the protective
exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors. 00 Due process is
satisfied despite the fact that the defendant is not given prior notice of
the statute's lien provision. As construed by the court, the statute not
only gives the indigent adequate notice of the lien at the time of its
filing but also affords him the opportunity later to contest the amount
of the lien and its enforcement.10' Moreover, the defendant is not mis-
provided for equivalence between defendant-debtors and other judgment debtors. Id. at 31-32,
523 P.2d at 1180, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
94. 215 Va. 274, 208 S.E.2d 752 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 901 (1975).
95. Id. at 280, 208 S.E.2d at 757.
96. Id.
97. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:158A-I to 25 (West 1971). The statute requires that a lien be filed
against present or after-acquired property of a publicly-defended indigent when the value of the
services rendered exceeds $150, with such lien remaining subject to execution for 10 years unless
discharged earlier. Id. §§ 2A:158A-16 to 17.
98. 134 N.J. Super. 21, 338 A.2d 202 (1975). In an article published before the decision, the
recoupment statute and especially its relentless lien provision were criticized for a number of
constitutional defects, all of them mentioned but found inapplicable by the court. See Burdening
the Indigent, supra note 22.
99. 134 N.J. Super. at 34, 338 A.2d at 209.
100. Id. at 35, 338 A.2d at 209.
101. Id. at 37-38, 338 A.2d at 210-11.
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led by being informed at his arraignment of his right to "free" counsel.
He is, "in fact, provided with counsel without cost. So long as he re-
mains indigent, there is no cost to him. It is only when he is deemed
financially able to pay that he is responsible therefor."'
' 0 2
In Commonwealth v. Opara,10 3 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
held that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had been
"chilled" by the failure of the trial court to observe certain due process
requirements in its imposition of a repayment order.1t 4 The court ob-
served that "[w]here neither the order nor the proceeding out of which
it arose contains assurance that only those able to repay will ever be
required to there is a real danger that some may choose to forego their
right to appointed counsel."' 0 5 The Opara court indicated that a valid
recoupment statute must include the procedural safeguards approved
in Fuller, Le., a hearing to determine the defendant's ability to pay, a
right to petition the court for remission of all or a portion of the
amount due after imposition of the repayment order and immunity
from contempt action for nonpayment without a prior determination
that nonpayment was the result of bad faith or an intentional refusal to
pay.' °6 In addition, the court noted that due process mandates that the
defendant be given both prior notice of the potential recoupment obli-
gation as well as some sort of accounting of his appointed defense
costs. 107
Although the United States Supreme Court did not consider the
defendant's due process or "chill" of the right to counsel arguments in
its equal protection invalidation of the Kansas recoupment statute in
James v. Strange,0 8 a revised Kansas statute' 0 9 was later challenged on
these grounds. In State v. Keener," I 0 this revamped scheme was upheld
102. Id. at 38. 338 A.2d at 211.
103. 240 Pa. Super. 511, 362 A.2d 305 (1976).
104. The trial court, unable to apply any specific recoupment statute, nevertheless purported
to find "derivative authority" for its recoupment order in a portion of the Motor Vehicle Code
which provided for fines of $100 to $500. Although the superior court held the reimbursement
imposition invalid because it exceeded statutory authority, it went on to consider the due process
and right to counsel arguments. Id. at 518-19, 362 A.2d at 308.
105. Id. at 527, 362 A.2d at 313.
106. Id. at 518-21, 362 A.2d at 310-11.
107. Id.
108. 407 U.S. 128 (1972). See also text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
109. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4513 (Supp. 1978). After James, the statute was amended to pro-
vide the defendant-debtor all exemptions accorded other civil judgment debtors. All other provi-
sions otherwise remained unchanged: the defendant, whether convicted or acquitted, was sent
notice by certified mail that the amount spent on his behalf for court-appointed counsel would be
due in 60 days or the expenditure would become a judgment bearing six percent interest, and that
such judgment becomes a lien on real estate and is subject to execution or garnishment.
110. 224 Kan. 100, 577 P.2d 1182 (1978).
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by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the face of a due process challenge
which argued that the statute provided neither notice nor a hearing
with regard to the recoupment obligation. The court, finding consider-
able constitutional protection not explicitly provided in the statute,
held that the notice requirement was satisfied by the notice of the debt
for legal services sent the defendant by certified mail, even though this
was not done until after the debt had accrued. Furthermore, a right to
object to the debt was implicit in the waiting period which followed the
notice, and a hearing on the validity of the judgment took place when
the state attempted to collect by execution or garnishment."'l
In 1979, a class action suit challenged the same Kansas statute in
federal district court where, in Simmons v. James, 1 2 it was deemed un-
constitutional on equal protection and "chill" of the right to counsel
grounds. Closely following the Fuller guidelines, the court held that
the fatal flaw in the statute was its disregard of the defendant's ability
to pay. 113 While the state argued that a "reasonableness" standard
should be read into the statute to render it constitutional (as the state
court had done in Keener), the federal district court found the statute
too specific on its face to permit any alternate construction.' "4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit subsequently
adopted the Simmons reasoning in Olson v. James," 5 finding the stat-
ute unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Without reach-
ing the sixth amendment issue, the court remarked that it "need only
take notice of its [the statute's] awesome and forbidding character to
realize that it emphasizes collection first and foremost."'"1 6 By way of
contrast, the Oregon law in Fuller was seen to have survived constitu-
tional attack because of its "nonoppressiveness" and "basic reasonable-
111. Id. at 103-04, 577 P.2d at 1185. Of the post-Fuller cases reviewed in this note, Keener is
the only one which does not mention Fuller.
112. 467 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Kan. 1979).
113. Id. at 1075-78. In this regard, the district court observed:
Every significant case located by this Court which has discussed Fuller notes that
the Fuller opinion emphasized that the Oregon recoupment law considered a defendant's
ability to pay....
We believe that a very strong argument can be made that the Kansas law's failure to
take into account ability to pay needlessly chills the right to counsel.
Id. at 1075 (emphasis in original). As early as 1972---before Fuller--a perceptive student writer
found the Kansas statute's failure to take ability to pay into account to be the crucial flaw in the
scheme, one which could be remedied simply by adding such a provision. See 20 U. KAN. L. REV.
344, 350 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KANSAS].
114. 467 F. Supp. at 1079. Although the decision did not reach the due process issue raised by
the defendant, the court remarked that the due process "protections" read into the law by the
Kansas court in Keener were not present either in the statute or in actual practice. Id. at 1080.
115. 603 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1979). The case was consolidated with another unpublished dis-
trict court case which had found the statute constitutional. Id. at 151-52.
116. Id. at 155.
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ness." 117
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Cook,"18
invalidated a statute which permitted the trial court to recoup funds
expended for appointed counsel from the defendant's bail deposit. Al-
though the statute appeared discretionary by providing that the deposit
"may" be used in this way, it offered no guidance to the court with
regard to its application.119 The supreme court, relying principally on
Rinaldi v. Yeager,120 held that the statute violated equal protection by
singling out only those defendants who had posted bail while exempt-
ing those not posting bail. The court found no "rational relationship"
between the legislative purpose of recoupment and a statute which im-
posed liability on only one segment of a class of indigents.' 2' Further-
more, the guarantees of due process and the right to counsel had been
violated by the statute's lack of a provision for examining the defen-
dant's present or future ability to pay.
22
State and federal courts, relying on Fuller, have come to consider
"ability to pay" as the essential touchstone of recoupment validity. In
State v. Miller,123 the Arizona Supreme Court upheld a probation con-
dition requiring repayment of defense costs on the grounds that the
trial court had properly considered the defendant's ability to pay. The
South Dakota Supreme Court, in White Eagle v. State,124 noted that,
although not all of the Fuller safeguards had been incorporated into the
117. Id. at 154.
118. 81 111. 2d 176, 407 N.E.2d 56 (1980).
119. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(g) (1979). The
statute seemed to presume that mere posting of bail indicates the ability to pay for counsel, a
presumption generally criticized, since in many instances bail money is either borrowed or posted
by friends or relatives. See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 515 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1975). See
general4y S. KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D. RossMAN, P. FROYD & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 322-23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KRANTZ & SMITH]; Kamisar & Choper, The
Right to Counsel in Minnesota-Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 28-33 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar & Choper].
120. 384 U.S. 305 (1966). See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
121. 81 111. 2d at 183, 407 N.E.2d at 60. In applying the "rational relationship" test to the
Illinois statute, the court followed the deferential stance of the United States Supreme Court with
regard to recoupment. See note 29 supra.
122. 81 Ill. 2d at 186, 407 N.E.2d at 61.
123. 111 Ariz. 558, 535 P.2d 15 (1975),
124. 280 N.W.2d 659 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1979). The South Dakota statute reads as follows:
Whenever the court finds that funds are available for payment from or on behalf of
a defendant to carry out, in whole or in part, the provisions of this chapter, the court may
order that the funds be paid, as court costs or as a condition of probation, to the court for
deposit with the county treasurer, to be placed in the county general fund or in the public
defender fund in those counties establishing such an office pursuant to subdivision (1) of
§ 23A-40-7 as a reimbursement to the county to carry out the provisions of this section.
Such reimbursement shall be a credit against any lien created by the provisions of this
chapter against the property of the defendant.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40- 10 (Supp. 1980). It is evident that although the statute pro-
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state statute providing for recoupment as a condition of probation, the
"essential protection," the conditioning of the obligation on the proba-
tioner's ability to pay, rendered the statute valid. In United States v.
Bracewell,1 25 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded a case for a finding of "availability for pay-
ment" of funds seized from the defendant at the time of his arrest. The
court held that, though not specified in the federal recoupment stat-
ute, 126 an inquiry into the defendant's personal and familial financial
situation was mandated by Fuller, and the funds could not be appropri-
ated unless a prior determination had been made that such recoupment
would not impose a hardship on the defendant.1
27
In restrospect, Fuller developed some relatively clear guidelines
for recoupment plans, despite criticisms leveled at the decision. While
the Oregon statute under review contained a number of procedural
safeguards which the Court approved, the preeminent provision cited
most frequently in subsequent lower court decisions (and equally cru-
cial in those upholding recoupment schemes before Fuller 128) is the re-
quirement that the defendant's ability to pay be considered before any
imposition of reimbursement. Without exception, where such ability
had been initially considered, the statute or court order imposing re-
payment was upheld; where ability to pay had been disregarded, the
statute or court order was struck down.
VARIETIES OF RECOUPMENT SCHEMES
A number of approaches to recouping court-appointed defense
costs have been used by various jurisdictions. Such a variety exists, in
fact, that the Supreme Court in James v. Strange expressly limited its
holding to the statute under review because of a reluctance to make any
vides for a consideration of ability to pay, it does not provide a remission procedure or for excuse
if failure to pay is not intentional.
125. 569 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
126. The statute provides:
Whenever the United States magistrate or the court finds that funds are available for
payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may authorize or
direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney, to the bar association or legal
aid agency or community defender organization which provided the appointed attorney,
to any person or organization authorized pursuant to subsection (e) to render investiga-
tive, expert, or other services, or to the court for deposit in the Treasury as a reimburse-
ment to the appropriation, current at the time of payment, to carry out the provisions of
this section. Except as so authorized or directed, no such person or organization may
request or accept any payment or promise of payment for representing a defendant.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (1976).
127. 569 F.2d at 1199.
128. See State v. Foust, 13 N.C. App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972); State v. Fuller, 12 Or. App.
152, 504 P.2d 1393 (1973); State v. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973).
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"broadside pronouncement" on the validity of all such laws. 129
The most prevalent form of recoupment is that of a condition of
probation. 130 Such a condition can be imposed either through an "om-
nibus" clause in a probation statute 13 or through a specific provision in
either a probation statute 132 or a general recoupment statute.133 Many
of the decisions regarding recoupment have reviewed such conditions,
including Fuller. Besides the Oregon statute, 134 however, only six of
the statutes containing provisions for recoupment as a condition of pro-
bation provide for a determination of the defendant's financial circum-
stances. '35
A second form that recoupment can take is that of a statute requir-
ing repayment from those defendants who were determined, either dur-
ing or at the conclusion of court proceedings against them, to have had
the financial ability to pay for part 136 or all1 37 of their court-appointed
defense at the time they received this defense. Under such a statute,
liability for repayment cannot be extended to include any assessment of
ability to pay which occurs after such services have terminated. In
most jurisdictions having such laws, recoupment is generally permitted
in varying degrees from partially indigent defendants as well as from
129. 407 U.S. at 133.
130. For a thorough discussion of the origin, theory and prevalence of this aspect of recoup-
ment, see Comment, Reimbursement of Defense Costs as a Condition of Probationfor Indgents, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1404 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Reimbursement]. See also Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d
1025 (1977).
13 1. Most probation legislation contains such a provision, which permits the court to impose
probation conditions liberally which are otherwise unspecified. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976)
(probation permitted "for such periods and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
best"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4104(3) (1979) (fine or costs may be imposed as condition of
probation); MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-35 (1972) (court may add "the following or any other" con-
dition).
132. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610(3)(k) (Supp. 1979); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 895.1
(West Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(e) (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.665
(1979); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 42.12, § 6(k) (Vernon Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 19.2-305
(Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.210 (Supp. 1980).
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56(i)(c) (West Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7(g)
(Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 611.35(1) (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.091 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9 (1974); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40-10 (Supp. 1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-66-6 (Supp. 1979).
134. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.665 (1979).
135. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7(g) (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 611.35(1) (Supp. 1980);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.091(2) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(e) (Supp. 1979) (costs imposed
unless "the court finds there are extenuating circumstances . . ."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-40-10 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-66-3 (Supp. 1979).
136. 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.7 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:158A-16 (1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-455 (1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(6) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2017 (Supp.
1980); W. VA. CODE § 51-11-7 (Supp. 1980).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2606(2) (1978).
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nonindigents. 138
A final form that recoupment assumes is what can best be termed a
general recoupment statute. While it may include provisions permit-
ting recoupment as a condition of probation or recovery from those
who were partial indigents or nonindigents at the time they received
their court-appointed defense, its ambit is a good deal broader. Such a
statute considers future ability to pay, thus imposing liability despite
the fact that the defendant might actually have been indigent while
being defended. This feature seems to transcend the narrow confines of
the Oregon scheme endorsed in Fuller which, because it was a proba-
tion condition imposed at the time of sentencing, reflected the defend-
ant's ability to pay at a time when he was still being represented by his
court-appointed attorney. The Fuller Court, though approving the Or-
egon scheme, did not go so far as to hold that only a repayment obliga-
tion based on the defendant's ability to pay at the time services were
received was permissible. In addition, there was no mention of this
issue in James, where the Kansas statute under review imposed contin-
uing liability for two years. A general recoupment statute, moreover,
can encompass both acquitted and convicted indigents. In fact, only
three 139 of the twenty-one 40 general recoupment statutes limit their ap-
plication to convicted defendants. The great variety and complexity of
these statutes require a detailed examination of the many provisions
found in these laws.
The first few features to be considered are those endorsed by the
Supreme Court in James and Fuller and are thus essential require-
ments for continued Court approval. A provision of constitutional sig-
nificance, one making repayment contingent upon a determination of
the defendant's ability to pay, surprisingly is provided for expressly in
138. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-297 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3209(c), -3211(a) (1978);
IDAHO CODE §§ 19-854(c), -858(a) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.100 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV.
•STAT. § 29-1804.10 (1979) (applies to felony defendants only); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-16-5(C),
-7(A) (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5236(c), 5255(a) (1974); WYo. STAT. §§ 7-1-112(c), -114(a)
(1977).
139. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455 (1969); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 77-66-1 to 14 (Supp. 1979).
140. The remaining 18 general recoupment statutes are: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2403,
-2408.1, -2408.3 (Supp. 1979); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West Supp. 1979-1980); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-298 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56 (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3211
(1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-858 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT.
§ 611.35 (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 600.100, .105 (Vernon 1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 178.398 (1979); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:158A-17 to 19 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-7 (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 793 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981);
S.C. CODE § 17-3-40 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-40-10 to 16 (Supp. 1980);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5255 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.66 (West 1971).
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only seventeen of the twenty-one statutes.' 4' Two of these, moreover,
make ability to pay applicable only to recoupment when it is a proba-
tion condition, not to the remainder of the statute which applies uni-
formly to both acquitted and convicted defendants. 42 The advantages
of a provision specifying the ability to pay condition is obvious insofar
as a constitutional test of a recoupment law is concerned. The vagaries
of individual court misapplication would not then jeopardize the entire
statute with the possibility of judicial invalidation. A related provision,
not necessarily of constitutional dimension, is one which permits the
defendant, after imposition of the repayment obligation, to petition the
court for remission of the amount owed and which empowers the court
to remit part or all of the amount if it determines that continued impo-
sition would pose a hardship for the defendant or his family. Only four
statutes include such a provision. 143
The next feature approved in Fuller is one which specifies that fail-
ure to make payment cannot result in imprisonment for contempt of
court unless there is a showing that such nonpayment was the result of
a deliberate refusal to obey the repayment order or a failure to make a
good faith effort to pay. The Pennsylvania' 44 and Utah 45 statutes are
the only ones incorporating such provisions. The Arizona 146 and Cali-
fornia 47 schemes obviate this problem by specifying that nonpayment
cannot be regarded as contempt at all, but only as a violation of a civil
judgment. Presumably, in all the other jurisdictions enforcement of
this requirement is left to the individual courts.
The provision which the Supreme Court found fatal to the Kansas
scheme in James was one which failed to afford the defendant-debtor
all the protective exemptions given other judgment debtors. Only two
statutes, however, expressly provide such exemptions.t 48 Ten other
141. Those four statutes not providing for such determination at some point, and thus in dan-
ger of being facially invalid, are: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2403, -2408.1, -2408.3 (Supp. 1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9 (1974); S.C. CODE § 17-3-40 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 23A-40-10 to 16 (Supp. 1980).
142. The dictates of Fuller in these statutes seem to be taken almost too literally. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27A, § 7 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 176.091, 178.398 (1979).
143. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 987.8(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56(4) (West
Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.091(3) (1979) (provision applies only to convicted defen-
dants); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-66-4 (Supp. 1979) (entire statute applies only to convicted defen-
dants).
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 793 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
145. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-66-8 (Supp. 1979).
146. 17 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.7 (1973).
147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56(6) (West Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40-15
(Supp. 1980).
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statutes, while not specifically enumerating available exemptions, pro-
vide that recoupment is to be treated as a judgment in a civil action
149
or as a judgment at law. ' 50 Seven statutes merely state that suit may be
brought for recovery of defense fees. 15' Presumably, this entails a civil
action with all its accompanying safeguards. Thus, of the twenty-one
statutes, nineteen provide, in one manner or another, for equivalence in
the exemptions accorded defendant-debtors and other judgment debt-
ors. 152 It must be remembered, however, that James merely required
that defendant-debtors be given the same exemptions as other debtors;
it did not require states to give any exemptions to debtors generally.
Other provisions, while deemed essential by some state courts,
were not contemplated in decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. One such provision requires that notice be given the defendant
at the time of the appointment of counsel that recoupment might take
place.' 53 Only two states, California 54 and Missouri, 155 include such
prior notice as part of their recoupment statutes. While other states
have notice provisions, such notice is merely notice of a lien or judg-
ment given some time after the appointment of counsel and usually
after criminal proceedings are terminated. 56 Another provision is one
allowing the defendant a hearing on the amount of the accrued defense
debt. ' 57 Connecticut, 158 Florida, 59 Maryland 160 and Minnesota' 6' ap-
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-298(b)
(1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.105 (Vernon 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.275 (1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-66-13 (Supp. 1979).
150. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7 (Supp. 1980); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:158A-17 (1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-455(b) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 793 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981); S.C.
CODE § 17-3-40 (Supp. 1979).
151. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2403 (1977) (suit to enforce lien for costs, which can include ap-
pointed defense fees); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3211 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-858 (1979); MINN.
STAT. § 611.35(2) (Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-7 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5255
(1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.66 (West 1971).
152. The two statutes which do not appear to provide such equivalence are: N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 604-A:9 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (1974).
153. See Stacey v. Staie, 30 Or. App. 1075, 569 P.2d 640 (1977); Commonwealth v. Opara, 240
Pa. Super. 511,362 A.2d 305 (1976). See also White Eagle v. State, 280 N.W.2d 659, 661-62 (N.D.
Sup. Ct. 1979) (notice not constitutionally required but should be given anyway); Kamisar &
Choper, supra note 119, at 26-27.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
155. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.105 (Vernon 1979).
156. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7 (Supp. 1980) (notice of hearing for perfection of
lien); N.J. REV. STAT.. § 2A:158A-17 (1979) (notice of filing of lien).
157. See Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa. Super. 511, 521, 362 A.2d 305, 310-11 (1976) (de-
fendant is due some sort of accounting of costs); State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676,
681, 521 P.2d 706, 709 (1974) (unfairness in requiring payment from defendant when he is not
party to fee arrangement).
158. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-298 (1977) (defendant may contest the value of services ren-
dered).
159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56(7) (West Supp. 1980) (full adversary hearing allowed).
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pear to allow the defendant such a hearing.
Some provisions have not been found essential by any courts but
seem to have been included for administrative convenience. Five
schemes permit settlement or compromise of a debt other than by the
imposing court. 162 The creation of a lien upon the defendant's property
is specified in eight statutes. 63 Finally, twelve statutes provide a stat-
ute of limitations on the recovery of defense costs;' 64 the remainder
presumably either impose open-ended liability or are subject to a gen-
eral statute of limitations for debts.
While most of the general recoupment statutes contain the two es-
sential components held by the Supreme Court to be necessary for vali-
dation, te., a determination of the defendant's ability to pay and the
equivalence of defendant-debtors and other judgment debtors, the pau-
city of other safeguards would appear to leave many of these same stat-
utes open to constitutional attack on other grounds. Moreover, several
statutes, virtually without safeguards of any kind, are especially vulner-
able to constitutional challenge. New Hampshire's terse statute, for ex-
ample, while applying only to convicted defendants, contains no
provisions for determining ability to pay, equivalence of debtors or any
other safeguard.' 65 The Arkansas 66 and South Carolina t67 schemes
also do not provide for a determination of the defendant's ability to
pay, although they do provide debtor equivalence.
160. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7 (Supp. 1980) (defendant may contest filing of lien; amount
of compensation set by court).
161. MINN. STAT. § 611.35(l) (Supp. 1980) (court to determine amount of fee in hearing).
162. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-298(c) (1977) (attorney general may compromise, settle or forego
any claims when "the best interest of the state will be served by such action"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.56(4) (West Supp. 1980) (board of county commissioners authorized to "satisfy, compromise,
settle, subordinate, release, or otherwise dispose of any debt . . ."); MINN. STAT. § 611.35(2)
(Supp. 1980) ("[lt]he county attorney may compromise and settle any claim ... with the approval
of the court..."); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 158A-20 (1979) (public defender authorized to compro-
mise and settle); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40-14 (Supp. 1980) (county board of commis-
sioners "may enforce, foreclose, satisfy, compromise, settle, subordinate, release, or otherwise
dispose...").
163. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2403 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56(2) (West Supp. 1980); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.275 (1979); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:158A-17 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455 (1969); S.C. CODE § 17-3-40 (Supp. 1980); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40-11 (Supp. 1980).
164. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2403 (1977) (2 yrs.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West Supp. 1979-
1980) (6 mos.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-298(b) (1977) (10 yrs.); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3211 (1978)
(4 yrs.); IDAHO CODE § 19-858 (1979) (3 yrs.); MINN. STAT. § 611.35 (Supp. 1980) (2 yrs.); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 178.398 (1979) (6 yrs.); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:158A-17 (1979) (10 yrs.); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-16-7 (1978) (3 yrs.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (1974) (6 yrs.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 5255 (1974) (3 yrs.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.66 (West 1971) (10 yrs.).
165. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9 (1974).
166. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2403 (1977).
167. S.C. CODE § 17-3-40 (Supp. 1980).
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Some laws, on the other hand, merit special attention because of
their inclusion of a number of detailed safeguards. The California stat-
ute168 is noteworthy for its careful consideration of the defendant's
ability to pay, to be determined at a full adversary hearing;169 its provi-
sion of prior notice; its provision of a right to the defendant to petition
for remission of his debt; its exemption of a nonpaying defendant from
a contempt action; and its provision that the debt shall have the same
effect as a civil judgment. The statute does not provide that recoup-
ment can be made a condition of probation, although one court tried to
use it for that purpose without success.
170
The Florida law' 7' has separate subsections for recovery from con-
victed and acquitted defendants, for recoupment from parents of mi-
nors represented by the public defender, for executing liens, for
petitioning for remission or modification of the debt, for settlement and
compromise by the county board, for all exemptions accorded other
judgment debtors and for an adversary hearing, to determine the
amount of the debt. The statute also contains a unique provision which
permits the county board to contract with a collection agency in order
to dispose of the debt. Curiously, the statute does not provide for a
hearing on the defendant's ability to pay before imposition of the obli-
gation. Such a hearing, however, is afforded either after the defendant
petitions the court for remission of his debt or after he defaults on his
payments; 172 in either situation the court is empowered to give the de-
fendant additional time or reduce or revoke the unpaid debt.
The Tennessee recoupment statute' 73 ostensibly imposes liability
based only on the defendant's ability to pay during the actual receipt of
his defense services. Unique for its detailed procedures for determin-
ing indigency, it empowers the court to order the social service agency
serving the judicial circuit to conduct an investigation into the finances
of the defendant and to use the report of this investigation in determin-
ing the level of repayment due from the defendant. Finally, upon a
168. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
169. This explicit formulation was added to the statute after an appellate court held that,
where a defendant had been ordered to make reimbursement after a "hearing" in which the prose-
cutor, not under oath, had made statements which were not subject to cross-examination, did not
constitute a "hearing" as contemplated by the statute. The court also said that the defendant must
be afforded the opportunity to testify himself and to present evidence. People v. McDowell, 74
Cal. App. 3d 1, 141 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1977).
170. People v. Johnson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 781, 104 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1972).
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.56 (West Supp. 1980).
172. Should the defendant default, he can be held in contempt unless he proves at the subse-
quent hearing that his default was neither intentional nor in bad faith. Id. § 27.561.
173. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2017 (Supp. 1980).
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determination of partial indigency, the court can establish an amount
and a payment schedule compatible with the defendant's financial cir-
cumstances. The payments only continue until the conclusion of pro-
ceedings in the trial court, at which time the defense attorney is paid
the funds collected less a five percent court clerk's commission. The
statute thus is unusual because recoupment is effected to compensate
the defendant's attorney directly, rather than providing for an indirect
reimbursement to the state which is itself responsible for compensating
the attorney.
74
In summary, there is a remarkable variety to the approaches used
by various jurisdictions in their attempts at recovering court-appointed
defense costs. Some states impose liability only on convicted defen-
dants and can condition probation on a repayment of such costs.
Others only impose liability based on ability to pay at the time the
defense was being conducted. Still others, the most numerous and di-
verse group, try to recoup uniformly from all for whom counsel was
appointed, regardless of the outcome at trial, and impose liability be-
yond the time that the services were actually received. Although the
majority of these schemes contain the two essential requirements for
constitutional validity as established by the Supreme Court, others re-
main open to constitutional challenge because of their failure to pro-
vide for these requirements, and an even greater number are lacking
features endorsed by other reviewing courts and commentators.
ELEMENTS OF A MODEL STATUTE
In drafting a model recoupment statute, primary consideration
must of course be given to including those elements deemed essential
by the United States Supreme Court. Secondly, those features not nec-
essarily essential but mentioned approvingly by the Court must be con-
sidered. Next, provisions considered important or essential by state
reviewing courts must be contemplated. Finally, consideration for in-
clusion must be given to provisions suggested by critics of recoupment
laws as corrective of certain deficiencies, as well as provisions which
appear necessary for the effective administration of such laws. The fo-
cus throughout should be on assuring indigents that counsel will always
be provided on request and that recoupment, if imposed, will be fairly
and evenhandedly administered.
174. Other sections of the Tennessee Code provide for compensation of appointed counsel by
the state, with account taken of any payments made to the attorney by the defendant. TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-2022 to 2026 (1975).
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Before embarking on such a discussion, it is necessary to consider
the question of how detailed such a statute needs to be. If a statute is
not specific enough, leaving too much to the discretion of the lower
courts, there always is danger that a particular court might misapply
the law and thus invite appellate reversal. 75 Alternatively, if a statute
is too specific with regard to a questionable provision, it can be ren-
dered incapable of a "reasonable" construction and ultimately held in-
valid. 176 Thus, although the direction to be taken should clearly be one
toward specificity and detail, thereby giving clear guidance to the
courts, care must be taken to ensure that such detail does not back the
statute into a corner of "unreasonableness." Always, some leeway
should be afforded the sound discretion of the court. For example, the
court might totally refuse to enforce repayment under certain condi-
tions, as when it determines that the defense was necessitated by a friv-
olous or malicious prosecution.
77
To begin with, the model statute, in order to maximize its revenue-
generating potential, should permit recoupment from both acquitted
and convicted defendants. Because the Oregon statute under review
only applied to convicted defendants, Fuller entertained an equal pro-
tection argument which maintained that the constitutional guarantee
was violated by the statute's unequal treatment of those convicted and
those acquitted or whose convictions were reversed. This argument
was dismissed by the Court's determination that a "rational relation-
ship" existed between the classification and the state's objective of
keeping those not convicted from further imposition by the state.
78
Although the Court approved the imposition of reimbursement only on
convicted defendants, such approval certainly does not seem to pre-
clude the imposition of repayment on acquitted defendants in other
statutory contexts. Thus, while the classification created by the Oregon
statute was sustained, the Court never addressed the issue of whether or
not such a classification was mandatory. Although some subsequent
decisions appear to have interpreted the conviction requirement as part
175. Compare the considerable difference in application and resulting judicial treatment of a
probation statute's "omnibus" clause, which offers the widest possible discretion to the imposing
court, in State v. Hess, 86 Wash. 2d 51, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975), where the lower court's order was
overturned, with State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 557 P.2d 314 (1977), where it was upheld.
See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.. 176. See Simmons v. James, 467 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-80 (D. Kan. 1979). See also text accom-
panying notes 112-14 supra.
177. Although repealed, the Alabama costs legislation provided that the court could hold the
prosecutor liable for costs if it deemed a misdemeanor prosecution frivolous or malicious. ALA.
CODE § 15-18-60 (1975) (repealed 1980).
178. 417 U.S. at 48-50.
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of the holding in Fuller,179 this seems to be a misreading of that deci-
sion. Other lower court decisions relying on Fuller fail even to mention
the convicted-acquitted distinction. 80 Actually, recouping uniformly
from both classes of defendants would comport with general concepts
of fairness and would tend to place the indigent defendant on similar
footing with his nonindigent counterpart. After all, nonindigent de-
fendants are required to pay their attorneys regardless of the outcome
at trial. When acquitted defendants with appointed counsel are ex-
empted from any repayment obligation, they are effectively placed in a
financial position superior to all other defendants-convicted defen-
dants with appointed counsel as well as acquitted and convicted defen-
dants with retained counsel.
Next, the model statute should provide that at a defendant's ar-
raignment or preliminary hearing, he should receive notice of his right
to appointed counsel in the event that he cannot afford to retain a pri-
vate attorney. Such notice should also include notice of recoupment in
the event that the court subsequently determines the defendant capable
of repayment. Assurance should be given to the defendant that only if
he is found able to pay will he ever be required to do so, and, that even
then the amount due and the manner of payment will be such as to
ensure that no hardship results from the obligation. The essential para-
dox of prior notice of recoupment was one factor that led the California
court in In re Allen to condemn recoupment as a "chill" on the defen-
dant's right to counsel.' 8 ' On the one hand, due process seems to de-
mand that one be informed that by accepting appointed counsel he
may be incurring a financial obligation; on the other hand, such notice
arguably "chills" the right to counsel by possibly inducing a waiver of
179. See Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1979); State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814,
557 P.2d 314 (1977).
180. See United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448 (lst Cir. 1977); People v. Cook, 81 11. 2d
176, 407 N.E.2d 56 (1980); Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa. Super. 511, 362 A.2d 305 (1976).
Indeed, the Kansas scheme invalidated in James applied to both convicted and acquitted defen-
dants and the court made no adverse mention of this fact in its decision. See text accompanying
notes 45-55 supra.
181. 71 Cal. 2d 388, 391-92, 455 P.2d 143, 144-45, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207, 208-09 (1969). One writer
critical of what he perceived to be an apparent expansion of the right to counsel in Allen acknowl-
edged that some defendants might refuse appointed counsel if they knew that they would later
have to pay for it:
This is equally true, however, of non-indigent criminal defendants-particularly those
with moderate financial resources-who are faced with the high cost of legal representa-
tion if they choose to retain counsel. Therefore, since the court's chilling argument is
applicable to both classes of defendants, it would appear that Allen could be read to
stand for the proposition that in California all criminal defendants are entitled to free, or
at least partially subsidized, court-appointed counsel.
The Supreme Court of California 1968-1969, 58 CAL. L. REv. 255, 259 (1970) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (footnote omitted).
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this appointed counsel. 182 Fuller seemed to lay this issue to rest by in-
sisting that the defendant's eligibility for appointed counsel is not af-
fected by the possibility of recoupment. 183 Moreover, some state courts
and other commentators have said that prior notice of recoupment is a
requirement of constitutional dimension. 84 Such notice might also
have the incidental effect of deterring false claims of indigency. Know-
ing that they might have to pay for their defense anyway, many
financially able defendants might choose to retain counsel of their
own.
85
A provision that also should be included, one not part of any pres-
ent recoupment statute, is one which would permit the defendant to
select as well as discharge counsel of his own choice in lieu of ap-
pointed counsel or the public defender.' 8 6 Such a provision would de-
flect a suggested equal protection argument: if the defendant may
ultimately pay for his defense services, he should have the same meas-
ure of control over his counsel that other paying defendants have. 87
This freedom of choice and control would help remedy the inferior po-
sition of the needy defendant with respect to that of the defendant with
182. See I L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS 113 (1965).
183. 417 U.S. at 51-53.
184. See note 151 supra. See also Burdening the Indigent, supra note 22, at 318-19; KANSAS,
supra note 113, at 350.
185. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 119, at 26-27. See also Note, The Representation of
Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 585 (1963),
where its authors state that "Itihe most widely felt abuse of the assignment system is the false
claim of indigency to obtain free counsel."
186. The ramifications and benefits of this "freedom of choice" concept of public defense de-
livery is given thorough treatment in KRANTZ & SMITH, supra note 119, at 259-62. The "judicare"
system of public defense delivery, which incorporates "freedom of choice," is evaluated in S.
BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE (1974). Under judi-
care, which is funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, an indigent in need of counsel
applies at a local Community Action Program office or at the county welfare agency where his
eligibility is determined and a card is issued if he is found eligible. The cardholder then selects a
participating local attorney, who is free to refuse a specific cardholder or not to participate at all.
However, in the areas under study (Wisconsin, Michigan and Montana), most attorneys do par-
ticipate, although the "extent of involvement is very uneven." id. at 14. It is significant to note
that, while the lawyers surveyed felt that freedom of choice was the best aspect of the program, the
defendants themselves said that the fact that the legal services were free and available when
needed was most important to them. Id. at 49. See also Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney
of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
187. See Recoupment Statutes, supra note 21, at 112; 56 MARQ. L. REV. 551, 554-55 (1973).
Realistically, this argument is based more on concepts of fairness than on traditional equal protec-
tion analysis. The Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a suspect classification and, there-
fore, does not trigger strict scrutiny. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-
29 (1973). Hence, any classification based on wealth (as this one certainly is) would merely have
to survive the "rational relationship" test. Since administrative convenience is a sufficiently legiti-
mate state objective under this test, the classification would probably be upheld. See note 29
supra.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
retained counsel and would do much to dispel some of the ethical ob-
jections to recoupment.' 88 One who retains an attorney, after all, is not
only paying for the attorney's services but also for the right to choose.
This right of choice is especially significant when consideration is given
to the low esteem in which the public defender is often held. 89 While
administration of such a "freedom of choice" provision might pose
some problems, at least initially, these would by no means be insoluble.
Such "retained" counsel could be paid by the court in much the same
way and using the same standards as other appointed counsel. While
some attorneys might be reluctant to defend indigents on this basis,
others probably would be willing. Moreover, the number of indigents
choosing the "retained" option would probably not be overwhelming;
many, faced with the immediate need for counsel, would choose ap-
pointed counsel or the public defender rather than shop around for a
willing attorney.
After receiving notice of the right to appointed counsel and of the
possibility of recoupment, the defendant requesting appointed counsel
should be presumed, for the purposes of the proceeding, to be indigent
and thereby eligible for such counsel. 190 In the absence of such a pre-
sumption, individual courts by briefly examining the defendant as to
his financial circumstances might apply uneven standards of eligibility,
especially in marginal situations. By putting in abeyance a thorough
evaluation of the defendant's ability to pay, all defendants are assured
of counsel when they .need it; if one is later found to have sufficient
income or unusually large assets, he can be ordered to pay at that time.
At or shortly after his first hearing the defendant should complete
and sign under penalty of perjury a financial statement particularizing
his income, assets, liabilities, dependents and any other information
188. See, e.g., In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 392, 455 P.2d 143, 145-46,78 Cal. Rptr. 207, 209-10
(1969).
189. See, e.g., J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
106-15 (1972), where the defendant's view of the embattled position of the public defender is
poignantly examined. In a survey reported by the author, only 20.4% of the defendants repre-
sented by the public defender (as compared to 100% represented by private attorneys) felt that
their lawyer was "on their side." Id. at 105. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), in
which the defendant's right to refuse appointed counsel and proceed pro se was upheld. The
defendant had declined the appointment of the public defender, contending that the defender was
"very loaded down with.., a heavy caseload." Id. at 807. One observer has also suggested that
Faretia eliminated an argument against recoupment: if the defendant were prohibited from waiv-
ing appointed counsel and subsequently had to pay for his representation, he arguably was being
deprived of property without due process. See Recourpment Statutes, supra note 21, at 111.
190. The "presumption" strategy of determining eligibility for appointed counsel is as good a
method as any, and is probably better than most. The defendant himself is more acutely aware
than anyone of the nuances of his financial circumstances and the impact that retained counsel
would have on him and his family. See KRANTZ & SMITH, supra note 119, at 318-19.
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relevant to his financial situation. The court may then refer selected
individual financial statements for further verification and investiga-
tion by either the court's social service department or other designated
agency serving the court. 19' Because investigation of all such state-
ments would entail considerable expense, selective investigation com-
bined with adequate publicity would ultimately serve the same
deterrent purpose; as word of possible investigation spread, defendants
would be less likely to falsify information. 192 This statement and possi-
ble investigative report would later become the bases for imposing lia-
bility.
Next, the model statute should provide that the appointed counsel
is to furnish the court and the defendant an itemized accounting of
costs at the conclusion of the proceedings. The defendant should have
the opportunity to contest this amount in a full adversary hearing if he
thinks the accounting is incorrect or improper. The court would then
award the appointed counsel a reasonable fee, setting forth the basis for
its decision in a written statement to be provided to the defendant.
93
Such a procedure would do much to blunt the "chill" argument that,
because he is not involved in any fee negotiations and thus is uncertain
of the extent of his potential liability, the indigent defendant may
choose to waive his right to appointed counsel.
94
Next, but most important, the Fuller requirement of a determina-
tion of the defendant's ability to pay must be included as the sine qua
non of any recoupment plan. This should be done, as in the statute
approved in Fuller, in a hearing held after the conclusion of proceed-
ings and after the reasonable defense costs are established. The hear-
ing itself should incorporate all possible procedural safeguards to
guarantee that the issue of the defendant's ability to pay is fairly de-
cided. As in the California statute, 95 the defendant should be allowed
to be heard himself, to present witnesses and other evidence, to con-
191. Such agency, whether already established or especially created for the purpose, could be
further empowered to administer other aspects of the recoupment program, such as receipt and
accounting of payments, disposition of petitions for remission, etc. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
2017(b) (Supp. 1980).
192. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 119, at 22.
193. The California statute specifies that whenever the court appoints an attorney for an indi-
gent, the court shall weigh a number of factors in setting the amount of compensation. These
include: customary fees in the community for privately retained counsel, time and labor required,
the difficulty of the defense, the novelty or uncertainty of the law and the professional character,
qualifications and standing of the attorney. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.3 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
194. See In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 393, 455 P.2d 143, 146, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207, 210 (1969);
State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676, 681, 521 P.2d 506, 509 (1974).
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
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front and cross-examine adverse witnesses and to receive a written
statement of the court's decision.
The ability to pay should then be weighed against an objective
standard of indigency, with a baseline standard of income set with ref-
erence to the current poverty level guidelines published by the United
States Department of Labor. 196 Besides income, account should be
taken of the number and ages of the defendant's dependents and avail-
able assets, and even then, the court should have the discretion to make
allowances for special individual circumstances before imposing- any
repayment obligation. Such a "sliding scale" formula would exempt
those below the baseline from any repayment obligation yet would re-
quire repayment of increasingly greater percentages of the total indebt-
edness by those determined to have greater income. Such a provision
would span the full scale of recoupment possibilities: from no recoup-
ment from true indigents, through partial recoupment from partial in-
digents, to full recoupment from nonindigents.
A decision must be made whether the model statute should extend
liability for a defendant's ability to pay beyond the time that he actu-
ally was being defended. Because the Fuller Court addressed an Ore-
gon scheme which appeared to consider the defendant's ability to pay
only at the time of the defense itself, it would seem that a statute strictly
within the Fuller model would not protract such liability. Fuller, how-
ever, though endorsing the Oregon scheme, did not expressly prohibit
such an extension of liability. Additionally, a statute not extending lia-
bility would exempt many otherwise financially able defendants who
were only temporarily "indigent" for a variety of reasons, including the
possibility that they may have been in custody during trial and were
thus rendered incapable of earning an income. Hence, a reasonable
statutory period within which a defendant is liable after he receives his
court-appointed defense would permit a reevaluation of these tempo-
rary "indigents," but would continue to exempt true indigents from any
repayment obligation. Long periods of liability, especially with respect
to acquitted defendants, seem intrinsically unfair--the thought that an
acquitted defendant can be haled into court some five or ten years after
his trial and ordered to pay his attorney's fees certainly makes the
whole concept of recoupment somewhat repugnant. Lengthy statutes
of limitations, moreover, generate many administrative problems, in-
196. The rationale and application of the United States Department of Labor's Bureau of
Labor Statistics budget formulations with respect to determining eligibility for public defender
services are considered in KRANTZ & SMITH, supra note 119, at 329-33.
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cluding the accumulation of vast amounts of paperwork and the back-
ing up of cases in already overburdened courts. 197 Therefore, a one-
year limit measured from the date of the conclusion of formal proceed-
ings against the defendant would be short enough to be administered
easily and avoid being overly oppressive, yet long enough to permit a
more in-depth evaluation of a defendant's earning capacity. A further
limitation, for administrative convenience as well as fairness to the de-
fendant, should be placed on the length of time installment payments
could continue. Two years would permit monthly payments to be set
in manageable amounts so as not to impose an unreasonable burden on
the defendant.
If the defendant is originally deemed unable to pay, the statute
should provide for a single rehearing, with all procedural safeguards, to
be held within one year of the date of the original ability to pay hear-
ing. At both hearings, the present, not future, financial ability of the
defendant would be evaluated. If the defendant is found capable of
payment at either hearing, his total obligation with respect to the length
of time his installment payments can continue is two years. Thus, for
example, if found capable of payment at the original hearing, the de-
fendant's obligation cannot exceed two years and a second hearing
would never be held. If found capable at the rehearing, his obligation
can extend two years from that date. The rehearing, furthermore, is
discretionary, and the court, if it decides that the defendant is a hard-
core indigent with little chance of becoming capable of reimbursement,
may forego a subsequent hearing and thus relieve itself of a meaning-
less formality.
Once under the obligation to pay, the defendant should have re-
course to petition the court or the designated agency administering the
recoupment program for remission of all or part of the amount owed.
Because fairness to the defendant dictates that there should be no limi-
tation on the number of such petitions, allowing the designated agency
to rule on such petitions would relieve the court of what might possibly
prove to be a considerable burden. The defendant should still be per-
mitted to appeal from the agency's decision to the court itself. How-
ever, in order to deter the recurrence of frivolous appeals, only two
such appeals should be granted during the term of the repayment. Fi-
nally, the agency (and in the case of appeals, the court) should be em-
powered to remit all or part of the debt if it should determine that the
continued obligation presents a genuine hardship to the defendant or
197. Id. at 342.
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his family. These provisions are adaptations of the ones approved in
Fuller and, in essence, are extensions of the ability to pay doctrine
enunciated in that decision.
To comply with the Fuller requirement that contempt cannot be
imposed without a prior showing that failure to make payments was
deliberate or in bad faith, 98 the statute should provide that the repay-
ment order cannot be enforced by contempt of court proceedings. By
so doing, and thus following the California' 9 and Arizona200 ap-
proaches, the model statute would avoid the problem of later having to
decide how and upon whom the burden rests to prove intentional fail-
ure to pay and what might constitute bad faith. Furthermore, an order
to repay should be equivalent to a civil judgment and all exemptions
available to other civil judgment debtors should attach. This provision
would be included, of course, to satisfy the equal protection require-
ment announced in James v. Strange.
20
The statute should not create a lien on the defendant's property or
assets. In view of the fact that an order to pay, when made after a full
ability to pay hearing, has the effect of a civil judgment, the creation of
a lien before such judgment becomes an unnecessary and burdensome
intermediate step. For example, the New Jersey recoupment scheme
creates "a lien on any and all property to which the defendant shall
have or acquire an interest. '20 2 This lien permits the public defender to
proceed to collect the amount due, using all remedies and "proceedings
for the collection thereof which may be had or taken for or upon the
recovery of a judgment in a civil action. ' 20 3 Thus, the practical effect
the lien has is to freeze the defendant's assets until such time as the debt
is paid or otherwise discharged. This freezing of assets can result in a
number of problems for the defendant, not the least of which would be
difficulty in finding employment and establishing a credit rating, unfor-
tunate effects which would be inconsistent with the purpose of a re-
coupment statute.
2°4
Finally, the statute should not have a provision permitting the im-
position of reimbursement as a condition of probation. Although the
majority in Fuller approved of such a condition, Justice Marshall's
equal protection objection remains compelling: while a defendant with
198. 417 U.S. at 46.
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
200. 17 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.7(d) (1973).
201. 407 U.S. 128 (1972). See text accompanying notes 45-55 supra.
202. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:158A-17 (1979).
203. Id. § 2A:158A-19.
204. See Burdening the Indigent, supra note 22, at 317.
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appointed counsel can be imprisoned for not paying his defense fees,
one with retained counsel cannot.205 The majority's response, that im-
prisonment is not imposed for nonpayment of a debt but for the willful
disregard of a court order, is unconvincing. Indeed, the majority ac-
knowledged that it actually did not have to address this argument be-
cause, in not being raised in either the petitioner's brief or in oral
argument, it was not properly before the Court.206 Thus, the door was
apparently left open for such a challenge in the future. Moreover, the
wisdom of imposing such a condition has been seriously questioned. 20
7
The oppressive nature of the obligation on one for whom imprisonment
looms menacingly ahead and the resentment this engenders can negate
what little rehabilitative effect such a condition may have. 208 In any
event, the recoupment statute, even without such a provision, would
take effect on a financially eligible probationer and would furthermore
afford him all protections available to the nonprobationer. The addi-
tional repayment incentive afforded by the fact that recoupment is
made a condition of probation is ultimately not worth the unfairness
and potential constitutional deficiency such a condition can create.
CONCLUSION
Recoupment of defense costs from defendants with assigned coun-
sel is a most delicate undertaking, one requiring adherence to certain
basic safeguards to ensure that the constitutional guarantees of right to
counsel, due process and equal protection are not offended. Although
the United States Supreme Court has offered some guidance as to the
design of a permissible statute, it has implicitly and explicitly avoided
confronting certain issues raised by recoupment. Consequently, con-
siderable controversy has surrounded these "open" issues.
Certainly, a model recoupment statute taking Supreme Court and
other guidelines into consideration can be drafted; and, unless there is a
radical and unexpected shift in judicial perspective, such a statute
would probably withstand constitutional challenge. This statute should
primarily guarantee the right to the immediate appointment of counsel
to any defendant who believes he is unable to afford to retain counsel,
whether or not his inability can be objectively verified at the time of
appointment. Moreover, the defendant with appointed counsel should
205. 417 U.S. at 60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 48 n.9.
207. See KRANTZ & SMITH, supra note 119, at 346; Reimbursement, supra note 130, at 1419-
20.
208. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 119, at 26.
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be afforded the right of choice and control with respect to his counsel as
nearly equivalent as possible to that enjoyed by the defendant with re-
tained counsel. Repayment, if ordered at all, should be commensurate
with the defendant's ability to pay and should never impose an open-
ended obligation or be required if any hardship might result. The true
indigent should be assured from the start that he will escape any fur-
ther obligation as long as his financial status remains unchanged. Ulti-
mately, such a statute would, far from inhibiting the exercise of the
sixth amendment right to counsel, truly implement the broad vision of
Gideon v. Wainwright 20 9 by assuring all defendants the right to the
counsel of their choice at the time that they need it the most.
ZORAN DRAGUTINOVICH
209. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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APPENDIX
The following model represents a composite of the many safe-
guards and suggestions presented in the foregoing note. By no means
does it purport to be a comprehensive enactment, since many provi-
sions, e.g., appropriation of funds, administration of payments, recoup-
ment from parents of minors with appointed counsel, etc., have not
been included. Rather, the principal purpose of this model is the pres-
entation of a statute incorporating such basic safeguards and provisions
as to equalize, as much as possible, the position of the defendant with
appointed counsel with that of the defendant with retained counsel,
while, at the same time, ensuring the constitutional validity of the
state's recoupment procedure.
MODEL STATUTE: PROVISION OF DEFENSE SERVICES
AND RECOVERY OF COSTS
Section 1. Presumption of Eligibility
Whenever the right to counsel for any person becomes mandated
pursuant to any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States or
of this State, or pursuant to the Constitution or Statutes of this State,
and the person indicates that he is financially unable to retain counsel,
he shall be presumed eligible for appointed counsel for the duration of
the proceedings for which such counsel is mandated.
Section 2. Notice
Upon commencement of any proceeding relating to the matter for
which a person indicates that he is unable to retain counsel, and such
counsel is required pursuant to section 1 of this Act, the court shall give
him notice:
(1) that, unless he waives his right to the assistance of counsel,
counsel shall be appointed to represent him in the matter;
(2) that, if he so chooses, he may select counsel of his own to
represent him and, if such counsel is willing to represent him, the court
shall appoint such counsel to do so;
(3) that at the conclusion of the initial hearing or shortly thereaf-
ter he shall execute a Statement of Financial Eligibility under penalty
of perjury and that such Statement is subject to investigation by the
court;
(4) that at the conclusion of proceedings for which counsel was
appointed, a hearing will be held wherein the value of the accrued fees
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and other expenses of appointed counsel will be determined and
wherein the defendant's present ability to pay such accrued costs will
also be determined;
(5) that if he is determined to be able to pay all or a portion of
such costs, he may be required to make repayment for all or such por-
tion of his defense services as the court determines him capable of re-
paying;
(6) that if he is found to be unable to pay any of such costs, a
subsequent hearing to determine his present ability to pay may be held
within one year of the conclusion of proceedings and that a repayment
obligation may be imposed at that time;
(7) that during any period when he is required to make repay-
ments, he may petition the court to remit, reduce or otherwise modify
the repayment obligation, and the court, upon presentation of satisfac-
tory proof, is empowered to remit, reduce or otherwise modify the re-
payment obligation if it determines that the defendant is unable to pay
or that the continuing obligation will pose an undue hardship on the
defendant or his dependents.
Section 3. Waiver
No provision of this Act shall prevent a person otherwise eligible
for appointment of counsel and duly notified of his right thereto from
waiving his right to such appointment, provided that the waiver is exe-
cuted in writing and the court has determined that such waiver was
made knowingly and willingly and with full awareness of its conse-
quences.
Section 4. Appointment of Counsel
After notice is given to a person pursuant to section 2 of this Act,
and the right to counsel has not been waived, the court shall:
(1) appoint counsel selected by the person to represent him, pro-
vided such counsel is willing to do so pursuant to the provisions of this
Act; or
(2) appoint other available counsel to defend him; or
(3) in counties with a public defender's office, appoint the public
defender to represent him.
Section 5. Dismissal of Counsel
The person for whom counsel was appointed pursuant to section 4
of this Act may, with the permission of the court for cause shown, dis-
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miss his court-appointed counsel and receive appointment of substitute
counsel. Dismissed counsel shall prepare an itemized accounting of
fees and expenses incurred on the person's behalf and such accounting
shall be filed with the court clerk who shall hold it for use in the Cost
Account Hearing.
Section 6. Statement of Financial Eligibility
At the conclusion of the initial hearing at which counsel is ap-
pointed, the defendant shall execute a Statement of Financial Eligibil-
ity under penalty of perjury wherein he shall specify his present income
from any source, liquid and fixed assets, liabilities, dependents and any
other information which might reflect on his ability to pay for counsel.
The court may order the social service agency or any other designated
agency or department serving the court, if such is available, to investi-
gate the financial circumstances of any person executing such State-
ment and to report its findings to the court. The designated agency
shall be empowered to obtain any financial information from any
source, public or private, in order to conduct its investigation.
Section 7. Cost Account Hearing
At the conclusion of proceedings in the court on any matter for
which counsel was appointed by the court, a hearing shall be held to
determine the reasonable value of the fees and expenses incurred by
the appointed counsel in the conduct of the defense. Appointed coun-
sel shall present the defendant and the court with an itemized account-
ing of all such fees and expenses, and the defendant will be allowed to
challenge such accounting. The defendant shall be permitted to be
heard himself, to present witnesses and evidence and to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. The court shall then determine the
amount of the compensation and shall present the defendant with a
written copy of its decision, setting forth the basis for its determination.
The court shall then authorize the payment to the appointed counsel of
the entire amount of the compensation thus determined from funds set
aside for this purpose.
Section 8. Ability to Pay Hearing
(1) Immediately following the Cost Account Hearing, a hearing
shall be held to determine the defendant's present ability to pay for all
or part of his court-appointed defense costs. At this hearing, the de-
fendant shall be permitted to be heard himself, to present witnesses and
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evidence and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. In de-
termining the defendant's ability to pay the court shall consider:
(a) the defendant's income regardless of source;
(b) the current poverty level income standard established with
reference to figures published and regularly revised by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor;
(c) the defendant's net worth;
(d) the defendant's obligations to his dependents; and
(e) any other circumstances relevant to the issue of the defen-
dant's ability to pay.
(2) If the court determines that the defendant has sufficient in-
come and/or net worth to pay for all or part of his appointed defense
costs, it may order the defendant to make payments according to a pay-
ment schedule requiring payment of a percentage of the total indebted-
ness commensurate with the determined available funds of the
defendant. Although such a schedule shall be an objective standard
using for its baseline the poverty level income as determined by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor,
the court may, at its discretion, modify the total amount due or the
amount of any individual payment if particular circumstances dictate.
(3) If the court determines that the defendant has the present
ability to pay for his appointed defense costs and orders him to repay in
consecutive periodic installments, such payments cannot continue for
more than two years.
(4) If the court determines that the defendant not only does not
have the present ability to pay for his appointed defense costs but also
determines that there is little or no likelihood that the defendant will
have such ability within the following year, it may order that a rehear-
ing pursuant to section 9 of this Act not be held.
(5) After making its determination, the court shall provide the
defendant with a written statement of its findings, setting forth the basis
for its decision and specifying the amount and manner of repayment, if
such is imposed.
(6) If repayment is not imposed and the court determines that a
subsequent hearing pursuant to section 9 of this Act should be held, it
shall set the rehearing on the court's calendar for a date no fewer than
eleven months and not exceeding twelve months from the date of the
Ability to Pay Hearing. The court shall notify the defendant of the
time and date of the rehearing and of his rights with respect thereto.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Section 9. Ability to Pay Rehearing
If the court determines that the defendant is financially incapable
of repaying the costs of his court-appointed defense at the Ability to
Pay Hearing, a rehearing may be held within one year of, but no sooner
than eleven months after, the date of the Ability to Pay Hearing in
order to determine again the defendant's present ability to pay. Such
rehearing shall follow 'll procedures and guidelines set forth in section
8 of this Act.
Section 10. Petition for Remission; Remission
The defendant may, at any time after the imposition of an obliga-
tion to repay the costs of his court-appointed defense, petition the so-
cial service agency serving the court or other designated agency
administering the provisions of this Act to remit all or part of the
amount due or otherwise to modify the terms of the repayment. The
agency shall review the petition pursuant to standards and procedures
to be promulgated by such agency and may remit all or part of the
amount due or otherwise modify the terms of the repayment upon a
determination that the defendant's financial circumstances h4ve
changed or that continued imposition of the obligation would pose an
undue hardship to the defendant or his dependents. There shall be no
limitation on the number of such petitions available to the defendant.
Should the defendant disagree with the agency's decision, he shall be
afforded two appeals from this decision to the court which originally
imposed the repayment order. Upon notice of such appeal, the court
shall conduct a hearing pursuant to all procedures and guidelines set
forth in section 8 of this Act. Upon a determination that the defen-
dant's financial circumstances have changed or that continued imposi-
tion of the obligation would pose an undue hardship to the defendant
or his dependents, the court may remit all or part of the amount due or
otherwise modify the terms of the repayment.
Section 11. Repayment Order Has Effect of Civil Judgment
An order of repayment will have the effect of a civil judgment and
all exemptions and protections available to civil judgment debtors gen-
erally will apply to a person ordered to repay the costs of his court-
appointed defense.
Section 12. Contempt Barred
No order of repayment shall be enforced by contempt proceedings.
498 CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Section 13. Limitations
In no instance shall an obligation to repay the costs of a court-
appointed defense be imposed after the expiration of one year, meas-
ured from the date of the conclusion of formal proceedings for which
counsel was appointed; however, if the obligation is imposed within the
one year permissible period, payments may extend for up to two years
following their imposition.
